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GEORGE A. ZAPHIRIOu*
I. INTRODUCTION
I would like to express support for the use of state or country interest analysis
as a useful methodological framework for choice of law. My support is prompted by
three major considerations: (1) the importance of policy analysis which goes hand in
hand with interest analysis; (2) the usefulness of determining the indifference or
interest of a state or country in having its law applied to a transaction with which it
is connected. This indicates to the forum how it can contribute to the give and take
of comity and abide by constitutional constraints; and (3) the need to balance the
respective interests of countries involved in regulatory processes, such as antitrust,
securities regulation, reexport control, and environmental protection, in order to
satisfy jurisdictional, and sometimes choice of law, requirements. I shall deal with
each consideration in turn.
II. POLICY ANALYSIS
It is both a historical and jurisprudential fact, with variations from state to state,
that the approach to law in the United States is policy oriented. It is also generally
accepted, at least in the United States, that choice of law does not consist of the choice
of a legal system, but of a choice of a rule of decision, and that it is necessary to
construe or interpret the potentially applicable foreign statutory or common law
provisions in order to determine the underlying policy and intended objectives. This
is an application of teleological interpretation which is universally favored. It is, of
course, conceded that policy analysis is not only necessary for the determination of
state interest, but is also necessary for the determination of the parties' expectations
and the socioeconomically better law.
III. STATE AND COUNTRY INTEREST
In the light of policy analysis, the court can determine whether the provisions
which claim application are reconcilable or conflicting and, if conflicting, whether
one country or state which is connected with the transaction may claim a greater
interest in having its law applied. If none of the legal systems with which a transaction
is connected has any socioeconomic interest in having its law applied, then the forum
is free to apply its own law or the law which accords with its socioeconomic
preference. Interest analysis complements the quantitative aggregation of connecting
factors with an overall qualitative evaluation. Furthermore, it is constitutionally
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necessary to assess the contacts with the forum and the legitimate interest of the forum
in order to determine whether due process and full faith and credit requirements have
been met. 1
IV. TRANSNATIONAL REGULATION
tj;2Transnational regulation lies at the intersection between public and private
international law. The problem of extraterritorial reach of United States laws raises
questions of legislative, judicial, and administrative jurisdiction. When a United
States statute expressly provides that it applies extraterritorially, the application of
American law follows as a matter of course. However, the extraterritorial application
of antitrust clearly raises a question of choice of law which is resolved by taking into
account, among other factors, the respective interests of the United States and of the
foreign country involved. 2 The determination of competing countries' interests in
areas of transnational regulation provides a useful guideline to legislative and
administrative activity and to dispute resolution by courts or arbitrators. 3 Often, the
distinction between jurisdiction and choice of law is not clear in this area of the law.
It becomes apparent when acts of state or state compulsion are invoked.
V. THE CIVIL LAW APPROACH
In contrast, some civil law countries are handicapped in their conflict of laws
analysis because they are stuck with rigid conflict of laws provisions in their codes.
These mandate the application of a particular legal system unless excluded by the
overriding consideration of forum public policy. The public policy scrutiny is
exclusionary rather than a positive factor in the choice of law process. Exclusionary
public policy is often parochial, whereas policy as a positive factor represents respect
for foreign policy considerations.
I share with some civil lawyers the view that the approach to private international
law in civil law countries will improve if the content of the potentially applicable
provisions are analyzed and policy considerations are applied positively and con-
structively rather than negatively. In civil law countries, the prevailing judicial notice
of foreign laws facilitates such a process while code restraints seriously impede it by
imposing in most cases wooden choice of law rules.
VI. PREDICTABILITY OF OUTCOME
The strongest argument against interest analysis is that it offers specific formulas
for specified factual situations, but it provides no general criterion for the solution of
conflict in new factual situations. I respectfully disagree with this argument. The
generally accepted basis of conflict of laws is a form of constructive comity in a
technologically integrating world. In some cases, there is also constitutional com-
1. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1952); Home Insurance
Co. v. Dick, 281 U.s. 397 (1930).
2. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'1 Trust & Say. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597, 613-14 (9th Cir. 1976).
3. As to the jurisdictional aspect, see REsrATmtmr (REvisw) OF FoRmGN Rt1noNs LAw oF THE UN rTm STATEs §§ 402
and 403(2)(g) (rent. Draft No. 2, 1981).
[Vol. 46:537
STATE OR COUNTRY INTEREST ANALYSIS
pulsion. It is therefore of great importance to the forum to determine whether it has
freedom to apply what it considers the rule of decision that satisfies party expectations
and serves preferred socioeconomic goals.
In the commercial area where predictability is important, it is achieved in
practice through choice of forum or arbitration clauses and the choice of law clauses. 4
It is hoped that increasingly flexible statutory provisions will regulate specific areas
of conflict of laws. This will increase predictability. In drafting such statutory
provisions, state or country interest and policy preferences are bound to play an
important role. Similar considerations apply to regulatory or choice of law conven-
tions in which the balancing of interests of countries provides the only objective and
rational criterion for the formulation of rules, standards, or guidelines that will be
acceptable to the signatories and contribute to international order. The balancing of
country or state interests, rather than being a doctrine of the past, is a doctrine of the
future. In a world that integrates under the compulsion of technological progress,
country or state interest analysis is bound to play an increasing role not only in the
field of transnational jurisdiction, but also in the field of transnational choice of law.
Cooperation in such fields as antitrust, reexport controls, judicial assistance, and
environmental protection will include agreements concerning jurisdiction and the
applicable law.
VII. PRODUCTS LIABILrrY
Applying the above thoughts to products liability, I suggest the following
tentative solutions:
Illustration (1): "M" Inc., a Michigan car manufacturer, exports cars world-wide and to
all the states in the United States. A car sold successively through a West German
distributor and retailer to "B" explodes in West Germany as a result of bad design and/or
defect in manufacture and kills or injures "B" or "C", a passenger, or "D", an innocent
bystander. Jurisdiction lies in either West Germany or Michigan. Both Michigan and West
Germany have an interest. The interest of Michigan is not to impose on "M" a liability
greater than that imposed on other manufacturers in West Germany. The interest of West
Germany is to impose on a foreign manufacturer at least the same liability that is imposed
on local manufacturers for the protection of victims. The negligence law of West Germany
should apply. The law of West Germany in connection with defects (though not designs)
and vicarious liability is less strict than the law of Michigan. Application of West German
law satisfies the expectation (planning) of the manufacturer and the expectations of the
victims. According to the generally prevailing view in the United States, strict products
liability is better law than negligence. The court, however, should not be guided by better
law considerations that would surpass the interest of the country and state involved and
frustrate the expectation of the manufacturer or surpass the expectation of the German
victims.
Illustration (2): "D", an owner-driver domiciled in New York, takes his car which is
manufactured by "M" to West Germany. The car explodes in West Germany and injures
"D" and "S", a passenger and German domiciliary. Action in tort by "D" and "S"
against the manufacturer "M" lies in Michigan or New York. New York strict liability
4. Zaphiriou, Choice of Forum and Choice of Law Clauses in International Commercial Agreements, 3 INT'L
TRADE J. 311-34 (1978).
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applies as to "D". But what about "S"? The position of "S" is similar to the factual
position of Susan Silk in Tooker v. Lopez,5 where, however, her position was not ana-
lyzed. It is arguable that German law applies in determining her rights, and this seems
to accord with the suggested solution in the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable
to Products Liability of 1973.6
Illustration (3): Conversely, if a car which is manufactured in West Germany and exported
to New York kills or injures in New York because of a defect in manufacture, it exposes
the German manufacturer to strict liability. New York has a strong interest in protecting
all the victims in New York by applying strict liability. If the car is taken by its German
domiciliary owner-driver and driven to New York and there, because of a defect in
manufacture, the car either kills or injures the owner-driver, West German law should
apply. New York has no interest in imposing strict liability. The expectations of the
German manufacturer and of the German owner-driver are satisfied. If, however, the car
injures a New York or Illinois domiciliary who is a passenger in the car or is an innocent
bystander, strict liability should apply.
Illustration (4): Products liability with respect to airplanes is to be treated the same as that
with respect to cars provided the plane is used within the national borders of a country or
state and the injury occurs therein. On the other hand, if the plane is used in interstate or
international flights, the state or country where the plane was manufactured and delivered
has a stronger interest than the interest of the country or state in which the plane crashed.
The connection with this latter country or state is entirely fortuitous and is not within the
expectation (planning) of the manufacturer. Multiplicity of domiciles of passengers and
members of the crew would render the application of the law of the domicile impractical.
The above illustrations are not intended to be exhaustive. I intend to cover
elsewhere, in a comprehensive study, the interrelated areas of jurisdiction, choice of
law, enforcement of judgments, and comparison of internal law as they relate to
products liability.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Country or state interest analysis in combination with parties' expectations,
whenever such expectations matter, provide a useful methodological framework for
choice of law and for the formulation of flexible alternative provisions in choice of
law statutes, in private international law conventions, and in agreements for tran-
snational regulatory cooperation. The Convention on the Law Applicable to Con-
tractual Obligations of the European Community7 commendably reflects such a
flexible approach. It also reflects a country's interest in protecting the economically
coerced.
5. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
6. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE IgrERNATIONAL LAW COLECION OF CONVENTIONS 193 (1980).
7. 23 O.J. EUR. COmm. (No. L 266) 1 (1980).
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Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis-Has It
Become a Paper Tiger?
GENE R. SHREVE*
It is difficult to imagine a branch of American law where scholars have exerted
greater influence than in conflicts, or to imagine a more influential conflicts scholar
than Brainerd Currie. This helps to explain the attention paid in this Symposium to
Currie. What is puzzling is that his ideas are still capable of generating so much
controversy. Except in a biographical sense, the plans Currie had for American
conflicts law over twenty years ago are no longer of great importance. What is
important is how, or whether, courts have responded to his ideas. The purpose of this
Comment is to suggest that, contrary to what the contributions of Professors Lea
Brilmayer and Friedrich Juengert might indicate, there is little in Currie's govern-
mental interest theory left to attack. The two most significant aspects of Currie's
theory were: (1) appreciation of interest analysis as a choice of law technique, 2 and
(2) the conclusion that an interested forum must always apply its own law.3 The first
aspect has enjoyed such widespread acceptance in modem choice of law theory that
it is hard to regard it as controversial. The second aspect, though controversial, has
been greeted by such a lack of judicial acceptance that it no longer poses a concern.
Currie's writing on interest analysis was his principal contribution to the
development of modem conflicts theory. He was chiefly responsible for the analytic
technique of determining state interests from an examination of the substantive
policies of the rules vying for acceptance. His contributions can be seen as part of a
larger movement away from formalism and toward instrumentalism in procedural
jurisprudence. 4 With others, 5 he questioned the formalism of the original Restatement
of Conflicts and its blindness to the substantive content of rules. 6 He articulated the
* Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1. See Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without Foundations, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 459 (1985);
Juenger, What Now?, 46 OHIo ST. L.J. 509 (1985).
2. See B. CURRIE, SEcrED ESSAYS ON THE Co.'i-cr or LAWS (1963); Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the
Conflict of Laws, 1959 DurE L.J. 171.
3. Currie regarded courts to be ill-suited to choose which of two interested states might possess the more deserving
interest. He advocated the application of forum law whenever "the court finds the forum state has interest in the application
of its policy." B. CURRIE, SaELcrvo ESSAYS ON ThE Co.-rCur or LAws, supra note 2, at 184. Currie subsequently offered a
more subdued version of his test. See Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw & CoNEIsw. PRoss. 754, 763 (1963).
However, he never retreated from his position that the truly interested forum should always apply local law. Discussions
of Currie's approach, more extensive than space here permits, may be found in Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts Law in
Ame can Perspective, 131 REcuEIL DES CouRs 75, 146-49 (1970), and E. ScoL.s & P. HAY, Co.rucr OF LAws 16-20 (1982).
4. I have attempted to trace this movement through an examination of more or less contemporaneous developments
concerning equity doctrine, choice of law, res judicata, personal and federal subject matter jurisdiction, and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Shreve, FederalInjunctions and the Public Interest, 51 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 382,394-96 (1983).
On the instrumental dimensions of modern choice of law, see, in addition, Alexander, The Concept of Function and the
Basis of Regulatory Interests Under Functional Choice-of-Law Theory: The Significance ofBenefit and the Insignificance
of Intention, 65 VA. L. REV. 1063 (1979). and Powers, Formalism and Nonformalism in Choice of Law Methodology, 52
WAsH. L. REV. 27 (1976).
5. See. e.g., Cavers, A Critique ofthe Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1933); Cheatham & Reese,
Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 959 (1959).
6. B. CURRIE, SuscrEo EssAys ON THE Co.,sucr or Laws, supra note 2, at 86-87.
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"true" conflict, where the substantive policies of each rule were at stake on the facts
of the case. 7 Currie's ideas of interest analysis have had widespread judicial and
academic acceptance. By whatever name, all modem choice of law approaches
include in their design some mechanism for probing the interests of the forum and
other jurisdictions by investigating the extent to which policies accounting for
substantive rules will be advanced through their application in the particular case. 8
In contrast, Currie's approach to forum favoritism has seldom been adopted by
courts. Courts have rarely been willing to dismiss the law of another apparently
interested jurisdiction on the ground that, because the forum is interested, forum law
must apply. 9 Courts may have balked not so much because invariable application of
the law of the interested forum is unprincipled as because the sweep of Currie's rule
deprives courts of the opportunity to sound principled. 10 Moreover, Currie's approach
may not have given courts enough to work with. His methodology stressed the
important concern of interest analysis to the neglect of two other concerns: problems
of judicial administration and party fairness.Il Currie's approach has not been able to
compete with other modem approaches in the judicial marketplace. Courts unwilling
to relinquish the idea of forum neutrality opt for the Second Restatement of Con-
flicts. 1 2 Courts willing to favor forum law, but wishing to sound principled while
doing so, prefer Leflar's ostensibly neutral but eminently malleable choice-
influencing considerations. 13
Today, Currie's governmental interest analysis is scarcely more than a paper
tiger. His view that the interest of a jurisdiction in the advancement of its substantive
policies is a valid choice of law concern is accepted by most as a basic tenet of modem
7. E. ScoL.r & P. HAY, supra note 3, at 17-18.
8. This feature has a central place in the modem choice of law methodologies which have gained greatest judicial
acceptance. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNucr or LAws § 6 (1971); Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in
Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267 (1966). It has also figured prominently in the work of the most influential modem
commentators. See A. VoN MEHREN & D. Trrumis, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS-CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT
OF LAws (1965); R. WEITrAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE Corcucr or LAws (2d ed. 1980).
9. The most famous example may be Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964). Lilienthal is
summarized in R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 8, at 370-71. As Professor Weintraub notes, the Oregon Supreme Court
subsequently appears to have recanted in Casey v. Manson Constr. and Eng'g Co., 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967).
Id. at 371.
10. Since Currie's approach required the truly interested forum to always apply its own law, see supra note 3, it
created no need or opportunity for a court to say that the forum was the more interested of two interested jurisdictions.
Yet, courts seemed to want credit for that point when they felt they could make it. It follows that they would prefer a choice
of law approach which attaches legal significance to the fact that the forum is the more interested. This may explain in
part the Currie methodology's lack of judicial popularity. It may also explain the California Supreme Court's marriage
of Currie analysis with the essentially incompatible interest-comparing concept of "comparative impairment" in Bernhard
v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976).
11. The importance of dealing with concerns of party fairness at the level of choice of law doctrine has increased
in light of the refusal of the United States Supreme Court in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) to read
effective fairness protections into the due process clause of the Constitution. See Kozyris, Reflections on Allstate-The
Lessening of Due Process in Choice of Law, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 889, 901-06 (1981); Shreve, In Search of a
Choice-of-Law Reviewing Standard-Reflections on Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 66 MINN. L. REv. 327, 345-55 (1982).
12. The Second Restatement "is written from the viewpoint of a neutral forum which has no interest of its own to
protect and is seeking only to apply the most appropriate law." Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28
LAw & CoersMP. PROBS. 679, 692 (1963).
13. See Leflar, supra note 8. Elsewhere, I have attempted to demonstrate that the migration of courts to Leflar's
approach can be explained, at least in substantial part, by the fact that his choice-influencing considerations technique has
offered a means of advancing forum interests which, if less chauvinistic in appearance than Currie's approach, is no less
efficient. Shreve, supra note 11, at 342.
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theory. t4 In terms of judicial acceptance, his more controversial ideas were still-
born. t5 It is understandable that continental scholars like Professor Dimitrios Evrige-
nist6 express polite wonder over the amount of time American conflicts scholars still
spend rehearsing points of governmental interest debate. This Symposium would be
exceedingly valuable if it did no more than lay to rest many of the scholarly
antagonisms over Currie's work. Other topics, such as the relationship between
conflicts and personal jurisdiction and developments in the codification of conflicts
doctrine, deserve our attention.
14. But see Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 Wal. & MARy L. REv. 173 (198 1)
(noting the widespread acceptance of interest analysis but questioning its underlying assumptions).
15. In contrast, true believers may still be found in the academic community. See, e.g., Kanowitz, Comparative
Impairment and Better Law: Grand Illusions in the Conflict of Laws, 30 HAsrmNs L.J. 255 (1979); Kay, The Use of
Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 CAL. L. REv. 577
(1980).
16. Evrigenis, Interest Analysis: A Continental Perspective, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 525 (1985).
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